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Elliott: Trial by Social Media: The Rise of Litigation Crowdfunding

TRIAL BY SOCIAL-MEDIA: THE RISE OF LITIGATION
CROWDFUNDING
Michael Elliott
I. INTRODUCTION

Crowdfunding is a rapidly growing means of raising capital and
fund new ventures through small individual contributions.' In just a
few years, this online industry has grown into an effective means of
funding everything from art projects to consumer goods to business
startups. Crowdfunding websites like Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and
AngelList have taken off, raising $2.7 billion in 20123 and $5.1
billion in 2013. The industry is expected to continue growing at a
rapidly accelerating rate. 5 While most crowdfunded projects offer
simple rewards for contributors-early access to funded products,
special recognition for contributions, or opportunities to meet the
project's developers-a new development in crowdfunding will
allow investors the chance to become a shareholder in the company,
6
bringing the industry closer to traditional investment methods.
Like crowdfunding, litigation financing is a relatively new and
rapidly growing industry. 7 The practice involves providing loans to
plaintiffs who need funding for relatively high-value lawsuits in
exchange for large payouts upon the success or settlement of the
case. 8 Litigation financing has long been a controversial topic.9 The
legality of litigation financing has been challenged on numerous
occasions with compelling arguments both for and against the
practice. 10 Despite the controversy, litigation financing is becoming
1. David M. Freedman & Matthew R. Nutting, A Brief History of Crowdfunding Including
Rewards, Donation, Debt, and Equity Platforms in the USA, FREEDMAN-CHICAGOCOM (Nov. 5, 2015),
http://www.freedman-chicago.com/ec4i/History-of-Crowdfunding.pdf
2. Chance Barnett, Crowdfunding Sites in 2014, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014, 6:11 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/201 4/08/29/crowdfunding-sites-in-2014/.
3. 2013CF
The
Crowdfunding
Industry
Report,
MASSOLUTION.COM,
http://www.crowdsourcing.org/editorial/2013cf-the-crowdfunding-industryreport/25107?utm source=website&utm medium--text&utm content=LP+bottom&utm campaign=201
3CF+Launch (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
4. Barnett, supra note 2.
5. MASSOLUTION.COM, supra note 3.
6. Barnett, supra note 2.
7. William Alden, Looking to Make a Profit on Lawsuits, Firms Invest in Them, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 30, 2012, 6:07 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/looking-to-make-a-profit-onlawsuits-firms-invest-in-them/? r=0.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing:Another Subprime Industry That Has A Place
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an accepted part of a rapidly evolving legal world and attracts more
and more investors every year.11 While currently a fairly small
market, 12 reports of firms with annual returns of fifty percent
or more
13
per year make it a lucrative option for savvy investors.
Seeking to capitalize on the growing popularity of both
crowdfunding and litigation financing, a group of entrepreneurs
created LexShares. 14 Launching in November of 2014, LexShares
offers investors a chance to bet on the outcomes of commercial legal
disputes and boasts an average rate of return of more than fifty
percent.' 5 To assure these returns, LexShares vets any cases before
listing them on its website. 16 LexShares earns a percentage of each
investment before an7y litigation and the rest is sent to plaintiffs to
litigate their cases. 1 The overall design of LexShares website
mirrors that of popular crowdfunding websites like Kickstarter.
Funded Justice, another litigation financing website, offers an
entirely different model of litigation finance. Launched in December
of 2014, the website relies entirely on donors who receive no
compensation for their contribution.' Designed to help those who
cannot afford basic legal services, the website offers cases in over a
dozen areas of law, including family law, criminal law, consumer
transaction law, and employment law. 19 In exchange for its services,
Funded Justice collects a fee from each campaign.20 LexShares and
Funded Justice show the breadth of litigation financing companies
operating today.
Part H of this comment provides a detailed overview of litigation
in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REv. 83 (2008).
11. See Daniel Fisher, Feeling Lucky? Maybe It's Time to Invest in Somebody Else's Lawsuit,
FORBES (Nov. 19, 2014, 6:47 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/1l/19lexsharesinvests-in-litigation/.
12. The market value of the entire industry is estimated to be around $1 billion. Investing in
Litigation, Second-hand Suits: Fat returns for those who help companies take legal action, THE
ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/fmance-and-economics/21575805-fatretums-those-who-help-companies-take-legal-action-second-hand-suits.
13. Fisher, supra note 11.
14. About LexShares, LEXSHARES, https://www.lexshares.com/pages/about us (last visited Mar.
29, 2015).
15. Fisher, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. Debra Cassens Weiss, New Website Uses Crowdfunding to Finance Lawsuits, ABA J.
20,
(Nov.
2014,
6:15
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/newwebsite-uses-crowdfundingtofinancelawsuits.
18. Meg Graham, Funded Justice Aims to Help People Raise Funds for Legal Fees, CHI.
TRIBUNE (Jan. 8, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/chi-fundedjustice-michael-helfand-bsi-20150105-story.html.
19. FUNDED JUSTICE, https://www.fundedjustice.com/en (last visited Mar. 29, 2015).
20. Graham, supranote 18.
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financing and crowdfunding, and outlines the most common
arguments for and against litigation financing. Part HI examines
current case law concerning litigation financing, including the
various legal strategies aimed at defeating the practice. Part IV
argues that both LexShares and Funded Justice create dangerous
precedents. Unlike standard litigation financing, which is relatively
innocuous, crowdfunded litigation financing poses major risks and
could encourage frivolous lawsuits. These risks must be carefully
remedied through regulation.
II.

BRIEF HISTORIES OF CROWDFUNDING AND LITIGATION FINANCING

A. Crowdfunding
"Crowdfunding" is the effort to fund ventures, "by drawing on
relatively small contributions from a relatively large number of
individuals using the Internet, without standard intermediaries,"' 2 1 and
22
is a relatively new fundraising source in the United States.
ArtistShare, the first major crowdfunding platform, launched in
2003. 23 The website allowed musicians to seek donations to produce
digital recordings.24 The platform's first crowdfunding campaign
raised $130,000.25
Inspired by ArtistShare's success, more
crowdfunding platforms emerged, the most successful of which are
Indiegogo, started in 2008, and Kickstarter, which began in 2009. 26
To date, Kickstarter has raised over $1.9 billion for crowdfunding
projects. 27
Crowdfunding is used to fund many ventures, including new
28
consumer products, art projects, humanitarian projects, and films.
Traditionally, crowdfunding ventures seek to raise small amounts of
capital for one-time projects.29 Unlike a traditional investor who
receives a return and increase of their capital, crowdfund investors
generally receive some nominal reward in exchange for their

21. Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. Bus.
VENTURING 1, 2 (2014).
22. See Freedman & Nutting, supranote 1.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Stats, KICKSTARTER.COM, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats (last visited Mar. 29,
2015).
28. Freedman & Nutting, supra note 1.
29. Mollick, supra note 21, at 3.
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to
Increasingly, however, entrepreneurs are turning
money.3 °
31
ventures.
business
new
for
equity
of
source
a
crowdfunding as
This process was aided by the passage of the Jump Start Our
Business Startup Act (JOBS Act) in 2012, though the regulations that
had the most significant impact on crowdfunding were not fully
enacted by the SEC until March of 2015.32 The law, once fully
enacted, will allow for crowdfunding of equity interests in startup
companies.33 Before the JOBS Act, equity crowdfunding was
unavailable for these businesses "because it involved the sale of
securities," which generally must be registered with the SEC.34 The
new rules provide an exemption from this registration requirement,
and will enable smaller companies to offer up to $50 million in
securities during a twelve month period while protecting investors
' 35
through certain "eligibility, disclosure, and reporting requirements."
The result is a more friendly approach towards equitr crowdfunding,
one of the four main types of crowdfunding models.
Crowdfunded projects generally fall under one of four fundraising
models. Many crowdfunded efforts are based on a patronage model,
where funding is treated as a donation with no expected returns.
However, the most prevalent crowdfunding model is the rewardbased model.37 These rewards depend upon the level of contribution3
with higher-quality rewards for larger pledge amounts.
Crowdfunding rewards range from special thank you messages from
the project team 39 to roles in film projects. 40 Another crowdfunding
approach is the lending model, in which funds raised are treated as a

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Press Release, Sec. & Exchange Comm'n, SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller
Companies' Access to Capital (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49.html.
33. Mollick, supra note 21, at 3.
34. Peter C. Sumners, Crowdfunding America's Small Businesses After the Jobs Act of 2012, 32
REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 38, 42 (2012).
35. See Sec. & Exchange Comm'n, supra note 32.
36. For a more detailed explanation of Title IV of the JOBS Act and Regulation A+, see Chance
Barnett, SEC Democratizes Equity Crowdfunding with JOBS Act Title IV, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebamett/2015/03/26/infographic-sec-democratizes-equitycrowdfunding-with-jobs-act-title-iv/.
37. Mollick, supra note 21, at 3.
38. Id.
39. Bringing Reading Rainbow Back for Every Child, Everywhere!, KICKSTARTER.COM (May
28, 2104), https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/readingrainbow/bring-reading-rainbow-back-for-everychild-everywh?ref~most funded ($5 reward).
INDIEGOGO.COM,
Lives,
Million
Inspire I
Let's
40. Coaching Movie
https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/coaching-movie-let-s-inspire-l-million-lives (last visited Mar. 30,
2015).
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loan. 4 1 Under this model, backers are entitled to a return on their
This model, also known as "peer-to-peer" or
investment. 42
"marketplace" lending, emerged in 2006 as a welcome alternative to
bank loans, which have become more difficult to obtain since the
2008 financial crisis.4 3 Debt-based crowdfunding platforms such as
Lending Club, a San Francisco business, vet potential borrowers
much like a traditional lending institution. 44 The final model is
equity crowdfunding. 45
As mentioned previously, equity
crowdfunding has only recently become feasible in the United States
and is rare worldwide. 6
B. LitigationFinancing
Like crowdfunding, litigation financing, or litigation funding,
utilized the Internet to grow into a full-fledged industry.47 Unlike
crowdfunding, litigation funding has remained a relatively small
industry, having tapped into only roughly $1 billion of the estimated
$200 billion U.S. litigation market. 8
Additionally, unlike
crowdfunding, litigation funding has received relatively little
attention from the general public and even less support.
Litigation financing firms provide non-recourse loans49 to
individuals engaged as plaintiffs in lawsuits. 50 These funds may be
used "to cover personal [or] legal expenses while pursuing
litigation., 51 If the plaintiff wins or settles the case, the firm is
entitled to a share of the proceeds, plus interest. 52 If the plaintiff
loses the case, "nothing is repaid and the lender loses the money

41. Mollick, supra note 21, at 3.
42. Id.
43. Freedman & Nutting, supra note 1.
44. See id.
45. Mollick, supra note 21, at 3.
46. Equity crowdfunding makes up less than five percent of all crowdfunding investment
worldwide. Id
47. Martin, supra note 10, at 83.
48. Investors, LEXSHARES.COM, https://www.lexshares.com/pages/investors (last visited Mar.
30, 2015).
49. A non-recourse loan is "a loan in which the lender has the right to take only the asset bought
with the loan if it is not paid back, and does not have the right to take any other assets. Non-Recourse
Loan, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/businessenglish/non-recourse (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
50. Martin, supra note 10, at 86.
51. Nicholas Dietsch, Note, Litigation Financing in the US, the UK, and Australia: How the
Industry has Evolved in Three Countries, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 687, 688 (2011).
52. Id.
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advanced.,53 For this reason, litigation financing firms must
carefully vet each potential investment.54 Firm members must have
both sound legal sense and business savvy to turn a profit. 55 If
litigation is successful, however, firms stand to make large returns on
their investments. 56 For example, in 2011, Burford Capital, one of
the largest litigation investment firms made $32 million on nine
cases for a return of ninety-one percent.
The practice of litigation financing emerged in the late 1980s and
early 1990s and primarily involved corporate lawsuits. 58 More
recently, however, litigation financing has expanded beyond
corporate lawsuits into areas including personal injury, patent law,
and employment discrimination cases. W Much of the controversy
surrounding litigation financing arose when litigation financing firms
began to offer funding for these individual plaintiffs. 60 Because these
plaintiffs are generally poor individuals unable to hire their own
attorneys, many viewed the high interest fees charged by litigation
finance companies as predatory. 61 Interest rates in personal injury
suits have been known to rise as high as 280%.62 These huge fees
tended to shift focus toward the litigation financing firms and away
from the defendants of the case, resulting in large corporations and
their insurers supported this shift. These types of defendants were
more than happy to see the public's ire on another party. On the
other hand, those in support of litigation financing argued that
litigation financing is often the only source of funding
for plaintiffs
64
who otherwise cannot afford the cost of litigation.
In addition to concerns for the underprivileged plaintiff, there are a
number of ethical issues involved with the practice of litigation
financing. Among these are concerns that litigation financing "can
inappropriately influence cases.' 65 The United States Chamber of
Commerce has argued that the presence of third party investors can
53. Martin, supra note 10, at 86.
54. Alden, supra note 7.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Dietsch, supra note 51, at 693.
59. Id.
60. Martin, supra note 10, at 84.
61. Id.
62. Jenna Hashway, Litigation Loansharks: .4History of Litigation Lending and a Proposalto
Bring Litigation Advances within the Protection of Usury Laws, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 750,
751 (2012).
63. Martin, supra note 10, at 84.
64. Id. at 84-85.
65. Alden, supranote 7.
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affect a plaintiffs legal strategy.66 Additionally, others argue that
litigation financing effectively turns the legal system into a stock
67
Finally,68 many argue that the practice might encourage
market.
lawsuits.
frivolous
Despite these concerns, the litigation financing industry continues
to grow. 69 As the practice gains acceptance, many lawmakers seek to
regulate the industry, rather than ban it outright. 7U Several groups are
pushing for rules that require transparency about cases funded
through litigation financing, and in New Jersey, lawmakers are
considering a bill that would cap interest rates on litigation loans.7 1
The most stringent litigation financing regulations apply at the
individual plaintiff level, while corporate litigation remains largely
unregulated.7 2 To date, there are no government
73 organizations with
direct oversight over litigation financing firms.
C. LexShares and FundedJustice
Launched on November 11, 2014, LexShares was the first
litigation financing company to apply the crowdfunding method to
litigation financing.74 LexShares was co-founded by Jay Greenburg,
an investment advisor who previously worked with Deutsche Bank,
and Max Volsky, a veteran in the litigation finance industry and a
practicing attorney at Schmidt, Volsky & Perle, a New York law
firm.75 The company applies the lending model of crowdfunding,
and accepts funds only from those individuals who are "accredited
investors" under SEC regulations. 76 For an individual to be an
accredited investor, they must have an earned income exceeding
$200,000, $300,000 jointly for a married couple, for the prior two
years or have a net worth of more than $1 million, excluding the
value of their primary residence. 77 Finally, while investors in
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
.69. Id.
70. Sheri Qualters, Third-PartyLitigation FundingHitting Its Stride, 37 NAT'L. L. J. 12 (2014),
http://www.nationallawjoumal.com/id=1202678199135/ThirdParty-Litigation-Funding-Hitting-ItsStride.
71. Id.
72. Fisher, supra note 11.
73. Hashway, supra note 62, at 751.
74. Weiss, supra note 17.
75. LExSHARES, supranote 14.
76. Weiss, supra note 17.
77. Id. The SEC defines several classes of accredited investor, most of which apply to legal
entities other than natural persons. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501. The above examples are the only classes of
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LexShares' crowdfunded lawsuits earn money only if the plaintiff
wins, LexShares earns its profits, win or lose, by receiving a portion
of the total funds raised by the plaintiffs.7 8 LexShares did not have a9
problem acquiring funding for its first case, a products liability suit.7
In a press release, Greenburg, Lexshares' CEO, stated that this first
offering, $250,000 for a product liability suit, was "wildly
oversubscribed.' 80
LexShares' current lawsuits include a
whistleblower lawsuit, a breach of contract 81claim against an oil and
gas developer, and products liability claims.
Launched just one month after LexShares, Funded Justice seeks to
provide funding for low-income plaintiffs who cannot afford to hire
an attorney on their own. 82 The project, founded by Chicago attorney
Michael Helfand, utilizes the patronage model. 83 Unlike LexShares,
Funded Justice does not require investors to be accredited. 84 The
website earns money by collecting a five percent fee from its
campaigns. 85 The cases currently listed on the Funded Justice
website include a landlord tenant lawsuit, child custody disputes, and
a class action lawsuit. 86 Within four months of its creation, two cases
realized their fundraising goals, and Funded Justice successfully
87
raised more than $4,000 for plaintiffs seeking representation.
III. CASE LAW CHALLENGING LITIGATION

FINANCING

Sometimes funded litigants, after securing a favorable outcome in
their case, will attempt to invalidate the financing agreement to avoid
repayment. 88 In these cases, a number of arguments can be advanced
to support requiring repayment. The most common of these are
accredited investor available to natural persons.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Cases, LEXSHARES.COM, https://www.lexshares.com/cases (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
82. About Us, FUNDEDJUSTICE.COM, https://www.fundedjustice.com/en/help/about-us (last
visited Feb. 20, 2015).
83. Martha Neil, New Crowdfunding Site Helps Individuals Raise Money for Legal Fees, ABA J.
(Dec.
15,
2014,
11:10
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new-litigationcrowdfundingsiteseeks to.
84. Help
For
an
Amazing
Mother,
FUNDEDJUSTICE.COM,
https://www.fundedjustice.com/en/projects/24040-Help-for-an-Amazing-Mother (last visited Sept. 22,
2015).
85. Graham, supranote 18.
86. Explore Projects, FUNDEDJUSTICE.COM, https://www.fundedjustice.com/en/explore (last
visited Mar. 30, 2015).
87. Id.
88. See infra Subparts III.A-IHI.C.
This repayment avoidance applies only to LexShares as
Funded Justice does not seek any repayment for its donations.
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claims of usury, maintenance, champerty, and barratry. 89 A usury
claim alleges that the litigation financing arrangement was a loan
with an unlawfully high rate of interest, 90 while maintenance,
champerty, and barratry focus on the undue influence the
arrangement may have on the outcome of a case. 91 Another
argument plaintiffs may use in seeking to void agreements is a claim
the arrangement was against public policy. 92 Finally, in at least one
case, a court 93has found litigation financing agreements to be a form
of gambling.
A. Usury
One of the most common defenses against a litifation financing
agreement is a claim brought under usury laws. 9 Black's Law
Dictionary defines usury as "the charing of an illegal rate of interest
as a condition to lending money." 5 Modem usury legislation
protects borrowers from unreasonably high interest rates.
Most
states have statutes setting limits on interest rates, though the limits
vary from state to state. 97 At a minimum, usury laws bar the lender
from recovery of any interest if the interest rate is found to violate the
usury laws.
In some jurisdictions, the borrower may recover
penalties for usury violations. 99 Some jurisdictions declare usurious
agreements unenforceable entirely odepriving the lender of both the
interest as well as the principal. 00 Usury laws do not apply to
advances, in which a lender loans money to a borrower, the
repayment of which is subject to a contingency. 10 1 As previously
noted, repayment in litigation financing agreements is generally
contingent upon plaintiffs winning their cases. This means that,

89.
90.
KAN.J.L.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
See Bernardo M. Cremandes, Jr., Usury and Other Defenses in US. Litigation Finance, 23
& PUB.POL'Y 151, 158-63.
See id. at 188-193.
See infra Subpart III.C.
See Wilson v. Harris, 688 So.2d 265 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
Cremandes, supranote 90, at 157.
95. Usury, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
96. Cremandes, supra note 90, at 161.
97. Id. at 160.
98. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 438.3 (2015).
99. See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/6 (1997); TEx. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.001(a)(1), 0,(2) (2005);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14-117 (2013).
100. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-511 (1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-166(d) (2013).
101. Cremandes, supra note 90, at 160. Only two jurisdictions include provisions for cash
advances in their usury laws. Id. at 160.
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to 3 usury laws. 10 2
ordinarily, such arrangements are not subject 10
Courts have ruled consistently with this conclusion.
Aldrich v. Aldrich is one of the earliest cases challenging a
litigation financing agreement. 10 4 Charles Aldrich, a practicing
attorney, represented the L.P. Larson, Jr. Company in two litigation
proceedings. 10 5 In need of money, Aldrich borrowed $20,000 from
Charles Brown, a friend and fellow attorney. 10 6 In return, Aldrich
agreed to repay the $20,000 plus ten percent interest on his
contingency fee in the proceedings "in the event of a payment or
settlement for more than $1,590,000.,,107 The agreement stated108that
the lender would realize not less than $50,000 from this interest.
Ultimately the litigation was settled for $1,900,000 in favor of
Aldrich's client. 10 9 The $603,333 contingency fee due to Aldrich,
now deceased, was paid to his trust. 110 Brown claimed that he was
entitled to the $20,000 he had loaned Aldrich, with interest, plus ten
percent of the contingency fee, approximately $60,333.111 Aldrich's
trustee claimed that the arrangement between Aldrich and Brown was
usurious and sought to void the agreement. 112 To ensure that the
agreement was considered a loan, rather than an advance (to which
usury laws do not apply), the trustee read the agreement as imposing
an absolute obligation to pay Brown both the $20,000 he loaned to
Aldrich as well as an additional $50,000.113 This would mean that
Brown would receive at least $70,000 under the terms of the
agreement.114
In rejecting all claims that the litigation financing agreement was
usurious, the Illinois Court of Appeals determined that the agreement
hinged on a contingency and was not a loan." 5 The agreement stated
repayment of the $20,000 occurred "when payment or settlement is
made." 116 As "[flew things in this world are more uncertain and
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.at 164.
Id.
Id.
See Aldrich v. Aldrich, 260 11. App. 333,337(11. App. Ct. 1931).
Id.at 338.
Id.at355.
Id.
Id.at 338.
Aldrich, 260 ll. App. at 338.
Id.
Id.at 340-41.
Id at 358-59.
Seeid.
Aldrich, 260 111.App. at 362.
Id. at 355-56.
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dubious than the result of a lawsuit" and this uncertainty cannot be
removed, the court viewed the agreement as contingent on the
lawsuit. 117 The court also determined that the provision granting
Brown at least $50,000 was a contingency hinging on the outcome of
Aldrich's case. 118 The court concluded its analysis by noting that
Brown was entitled to the full amount of the repayment as "Brown
was risking every dollar he advanced to Aldrich and [ ] his only hope
of getting any of it back was based alone upon the contingencies [ ]
that [Aldrich's client] should win the law suit, and, second, that the
decree entered would be for an amount large enough to cover prior
encumbrances as well as Brown's claim."'1 19
Courts are not always willing to uphold litigation financing
agreements, however. In cases where the "contingency" is illusory
and repayment is virtually guaranteed, courts are more willing to
declare the financing agreement usurious. In Lawsuit Financial,
L.L.C. v. Curry, the defendant, Mary Curry, was injured in an
automobile accident and brought suit against the party responsible for
her accident. 120 During its pleadings in advance of the trial, the
defendants in Curry's lawsuit admitted liability, and disputed only
the amount of damages owed. 121 While still in the early phases of the
accident lawsuit, she approached Lawsuit Financial, L.L.C. for
advance funds and received a total of $177,500 in three separate
payments. 12 2 In return, Curry agreed that she would repay the loan
with the greater of $887,500 or ten percent of the proceeds of the
lawsuit. 12 The first advance was not made until nine days after the
jury verdict awarded Curry $27 million in damages. 124 Ultimately,
the suit would settle for $4.7 million. 125 Lawsuit Financial demanded
that Curry pay the $887,500 owed. 126 After being repeatedly
ignored, Lawsuit Financial sued Curry and her lawyer for conversion,
breach of contract, and tortious interference with the contract.1 27
The Court of Appeals ruled that the agreement was usurious.
117. Id. at 358.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 365.
120. Lawsuit Fin., L.L.C. v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 239. The only remaining issues "were a motion for remittitur and a determination of
the propriety of the" jury award. Id. at 237.
125. Lawsuit Fin., 683 N.W.2d at 237.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 235.
128. Id.at 240.
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Due to the timing of the advance and the prior admission of liability,
the court ruled that the plaintiff had an "absolute right to payment"
and deemed the agreement to be a loan.129 As the interest rate on the
loan far exceeded the maximum legal interest rate of seven percent,
Lawsuit Financial was barred from recovering any interest or other
fees. 130

Further, in cases where there was a very low probability that
judgment would not be in favor of the borrower and repayment was
virtually guaranteed, at least one court has been willing to declare
such financing agreements to be usurious. 131 In Echeverriav. Estate
132
of Lindner, the borrower was injured in a construction accident.
The debtor entered into an agreement with LawCash and was given
"$25,000 at an interest rate of 3.85%, compounded monthly."1' 33 The
court held that, given the high probability that the plaintiff would win
his strict-liability labor law case, the transaction was a usurious
loan. 134 The court subsequently adjusted
135 the agreement's interest rate
annum.
per
interest
percent
to sixteen
B. Maintenance, Champerty, and Barratry
Maintenance, champerty, and barratry are three similar common
law doctrines arising out of English common law and can be traced
back to medieval England. 136 All three are used in attempts to
invalidate litigation finance agreements on the grounds that the
financier was an outside party improperly involved in the case. 37
First, "maintenance is the 'assistance in prosecuting or defending a
lawsuit given to a litigant by someone who has no bona fide interest
in the case' or 'meddling in someone else's litigation.""138 Next,
champerty is maintenance with the added element of personal gain,
where the party committing the offense does so in return for a share
of the property. 1 39 Finally, barratry is the "vexatious incitement to

129. Id. at 239.
130. Lawsuit Fin., 683 N.W.2d at 240.
131. Cremandes, supra note 90, at 174-76. See also Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, 7 Misc. 3d
1019(A), at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
132. Echeverria,7 Misc. 3d 1019(A) at *1.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *8.
135. Id. at*12.
136. 15-83 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 83.10 (2015) [hereinafter CORBIN].
137. See Cremandes, supranote 90, at 188-89.
138. Id. (citing Maintenance,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)).
139. CORBIN, supranote 136, at § 83.10.
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litigation, especially by soliciting potential legal clients." 140 The
Supreme Court explains the relationship between the three doctrines
as follows: "maintenance is helping another prosecute a suit;
champerty is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the
outcome; and
barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or
141
champerty."'
Interestingly, the doctrines arose in response to litigation financing
arrangements in medieval England. 142 In these arrangements,
wealthier individuals would obtain interests in the legal claims of
others, often in disputes over land titles. 143 The financiers would
receive a piece of the land in exchange for their investment. 144 The
risk involved in such disputes led wealthy parties to take all
necessary steps to win, often resorting to unsavory practices
including preventing "witnesses from appearing in court." 14 5

The

doctrines of maintenance, champerty, and barratry were meant to
eradicate these practices.

In the United States, laws regarding these doctrines vary by
state. 147 There is some evidence that a third-party funding agreement
may be voided 14entirely
in a minority of states under one of these
three doctrines. 8 Some states, including Maryland and Mississippi,
explicitly criminalize champertous agreements by statute. 14 9 Overall,
however, the trend across the country is toward limitations on the
doctrine of champerty. 15 For example, New York does not prohibit
litigation finance arrangements as champertous so long as the case
is
1 51
already in existence and the litigant maintains control of the case.
Finally, some states that formerly recognized maintenance and
140. Cremandes, supra note 90, at 189 (citing Barratry,BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.
2009)).
141. CORBIN, supranote 136, at § 83.10 (citing In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,424 n.15 (1978)).
142. Id.
143. Id.

144. Id.
145. Id.

146. CORBIN, supranote 136, at § 83.10.
147. Cremandes, supra note 90, at 189.
148. Id. A survey by Lisa B. Nieuwveld and Victoria Shannon shows that a litigation financing
"agreement may be voided in nineteen states under the doctrines of maintenance, champerty, or public
policy."

Id.

(citing LISA B. NIEUWVELD & VICTORIA SHANNON, THIRD-PARTY

FUNDING IN

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 119 (2012)).
149. MD. CODE ANN., BuS. OCC. & PROF. § 10-604(b) (2008); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-9-11
(2013).
150. Cremandes, supra note 90, at 189 (citing Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d
1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011)); see also Am. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, WHITE PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCE 12

(2012).
151. SB Schwartz & Co., Inc. v Levine, 918 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
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champerty are eliminating these doctrines entirely. For example, in
Saladini v. Righellis, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
struck down all three doctrines. 152 In Saladini, the plaintiff agreed to
fund Righellis's lawsuit in return for fifty percent of the recovery
after attorney's fees. 153 The court held that the agreement was
champertous but declined to uphold the doctrine, stating "we have
long abandoned the view that litigation is suspect, and have
recognized that agreements to purchase an interest in an action may
actually foster resolution of a dispute."' 154 South Carolina's highest
court soon followed suit, abolishing champerty as a defense in 2000,
stating, "[w]e abolish champerty as a defense because we believe it
no longer is required to prevent the evils traditionally
associated with
'1 55
times."
medieval
in
developed
it
as
the doctrine
C. Alternative Public Policy Claims
A few courts have found alternative grounds for invalidating
litigation financing agreements as violations of public policy. Such
public policy claims are almost always included alongside claims of
maintenance and champerty.1 56 A few states will analyze cases on a
case-by-case basis, voiding agreements that perpetuate litigation or
take advantage of one of the parties involved in the agreement to be
purchased, while allowing those that are not overtly manipulative.
In Anglo-Dutch Petroleum International,Inc. v. Haskell, AngloDutch Petroleum International, Inc. (Anglo-Dutch) filed a lawsuit
against Halliburton and Ramco for misappropriation of trade
secrets. 157 In desperate straits, Anglo-Dutch entered into an
agreement with a number of investors to fund the litigation and
operate its business until it could recover a judgment.1 58 The
company received $560,000 from investors.' 5
The trial court
eventually entered judgment in favor of Anglo-Dutch in the amount

152. See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 1997).
153. Id. at 1224-25.
154. Id. at 1226 (citing Joy v. Metcalf, 37 N.E. 671 (Mass. 1894)).
155. Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P'ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 279 (S.C. 2000).
156. See Sneed v. Ford Motor Co., 735 So. 2d 306, 314 (Miss. 1999) ("The historical
condemnation of champerty and maintenance is grounded in the estimable purpose of preventing the
marketing of lawsuits .... "); Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing
Hackett v. Hammel, 241 N.W. 68, 69 (Minn. 1932) ("an agreement in which [a party] had no interest
otherwise, and when he is in no way related to the party he aids, is champertous and void as against
public policy").
157. Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tex. App. 2006).
158. Id. at 90-91.
159. Id. at 91.
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of $81 million. 160 The company then refused to repay its investors,
sending a letter disputing the validity of the funding agreement and
requesting that they accept a reduced payment. 16 Anglo-Dutch
further asserted that refusal to accept the lower payment "put at risk
1 62
Anglo-Dutch's ability to resolve the [1]awsuit with Halliburton."
When no agreement was reached, the investors filed suit, alleging
"breach of contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and
conversion."1' 63 At trial, Anglo-Dutch contended that the agreements
"prey on financially desperate plaintiffs, give [outside] parties control
over litigation ... and prolong litigation by inhibiting plaintiffs from
settling lawsuits."' 164 In addition, Anglo-Dutch asserted that the
agreements were usurious 165 and champertous. 166
The Court of Appeals dismissed all of Anglo-Dutch's asserted
defenses. 167 The court found that the agreement was based on a real
contingency and therefore could not be usurious. 1 6 8 The court further
noted that champertous agreements are not automatically void under
Texas law. 169 Finally, the court refused to void the agreement for
being against public policy for giving outside parties undue influence
over litigation.1 70 The court noted that Anglo-Dutch actively
solicited the investments to cover its expenses and would not have
been able to prosecute Halliburton without the funding. 171 Further,
the court found no evidence that the investors maintained control
over any aspect of the Halliburton lawsuit. 172 The court considered
the following as possible methods of undue control: the ability to
select counsel "direct trial strategy, or participate in settlement
discussions."' 17
Finally, the 74court found no evidence that the
agreement prolonged litigation. 1

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
Anglo-Dutch, 193 S.W.3d at 93.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 103.
Anglo-Dutch, 193 S.W.3d at 105.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 104.
Anglo-Dutch, 193 S.W.3d at 104.
Id.
Id.
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D. Gambling

One final claim that has been advanced as a defense to a litigation
financing arrangement is that the agreement itself violates illegal
gambling statutes. While courts have discussed the possibility of
such agreements violating gambling laws, 175 only Alabama has
17 6
invalidated litigation finance contract for violating such a statute.
In Wilson v. Harris,Annie Harris sued Sears, Roebuck & Company,

and other defendants, for wrongful death. 177 The case was pending

on appeal for two years at great cost to Harris. 178 Wilson, a close

friend, agreed to advance Harris money in exchange for a portion of

the recovery. 179 The Court of Appeals held the agreement between
the two parties to be in violation of Alabama's gambling laws, which
prohibit "all contracts founded in whole or part on a gambling
consideration."'18 ° No other court has followed the ruling in Wilson,
and several courts have taken the opposite position.1 8 1 In Odell v.
Legal Bucks, the court determined that the litigation finance
agreement did not fit into the precise definition for1 what
constitutes a
"wager" or "bet" under the laws of North Carolina. 82
IV. THE

CASE AGAINST ALLOWING CROWDFUNDED LITIGATION

FINANCING

While there are many pitfalls and risks associated with traditional
third party litigation financing, there are clear signs that the industry
is becoming more accepted in states where it is still permitted.' 3
Some states, such as Maine, Nebraska,
and Ohio, have even launched
1 84
industry.
the
regulate
to
efforts
175. See, e.g., Lingel v. Olbin, 8 P.3d 1163, 1167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
176. Anthony J. Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits After the Event: From Champerty to Insurance, 60
DEPAUL L. REv. 453, 457-58 (2011).
177. Wilson v. Harris, 688 So. 2d 265, 266 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 268, 270.
181. Butler v. Davies, 109 F.2d 88, 90 (10th Cir. 1940).
182. Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 772-73 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). The court
defined a "bet" as "an agreement to pay something of value upon the happening or nonhappening of a
specified contingent event. Someone must take the other side of an uncertain event to give meaning to a
'bet."' Id. at 772. It defined "wager" as "contracts in which the parties in effect stipulate that they will
gain or lose upon the happening of an uncertain event, in which they have no interest except that arising
from the possibility of such gain or loss." Id. at 772-73. As the plaintiff in Odell was an interested
party, and the financier and the plaintiff were both on the same "side" of the bet (they would win or lose
on the same contingency), neither definition applied. Id. at 773.
183. See supra Parts 1 and IN.
184. See infra Part IV.
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In 2007, Maine amended its Consumer Credit Code to include
regulations for the litigation financing industry.' 85 These regulations,
the Maine Consumer Credit Code Legal Funding Practices (Funding
Practices), require litigation financing providers to register with a
state administrator, a process involving a demonstration of financial
responsibility. 186 The Funding Practices require financing agreement
contracts to be "clear and coherent" and provide for full disclosure,
including the calculation of the annual percentage rate. 18 7 Further,
the contracts must inform the borrower that the company providing
the funding has no right to make any decisions in the borrower's
case. 188
In 2008, Ohio enacted O.R.C. § 1349.55, which sets forth similar
disclosure requirements, including the itemization of all one-time
fees, the annual percentage rate, and a notification that the financier
has no right to dictate the underlying case.1 89 Notably missing from
the Ohio regulations, however, is the registration requirement
included in the Maine statute.
In 2010, Nebraska enacted its Nonrecourse Civil Litigation Act
(Act). 190 Like the Maine statute, the Act requires registration. 191 The
Act allows the Secretary of State to refuse registration to any
litigation finance firm that it deems unfit or financially
irresponsible. 192 In addition, the Act requires the Secretary of State
to gather information from registered firms, including the number of
litigation contributions, the amount
of such contributions, and the
93
amount charged to borrowers. 1
These regulations are an excellent start toward fully regulating the
litigation financing industry. However, they do not address some of
the major issues posed in crowdfunded litigation financing, as they
only regulate relations between the finance firm and the plaintiff. No
regulation currently exists in the United States to protect defendants
from the potentially disastrous effects of litigation financing: an
increased risk of frivolous litigation, as well as trial by media.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

ME. REv. STAT. tit. 9-A, §§ 12-101 (2008).
Id. § 12-106.
Id. § 12-104.
Id.
OH!OREV. CODEANN. § 1349.55(B) (2008).
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-3302-3309 (2010).
Id. § 25-3309.
Id. § 25-3309(2).
Id. § 25-3309(6).
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A. Risk of FrivolousLitigation

As discussed in Part II, crowdfunding websites take advantage of
the proliferation of the Internet to reach a mass audience. Once
uploaded onto a crowdfunding website, anyone with a computer,
phone, or tablet can contribute to a project. No single user need to
contribute more than a few dollars for the project to meet its goals.
Using this method, crowdfunded projects are capable of raising a
substantial amount of funding in a startlingly short period of time.
For example, the list of the most funded projects on Kickstarter since
inception in 2009 includes almost 100 projects that successfully
raised over $1 million through crowdfunding in less than sixty
days. 194 Of this number, at least eight projects were able to raise $1
million in less than a single day, one raising $1 million in under thirty
minutes, entirely through crowdfunding.195This phenomenon, with respect to litigation financing, would open
the door to frivolous litigation. Traditional litigation funding firms
must carefully vet each case before they make any investment
decisions. 19 6 A single firm will often lend a considerable amount of
money to a plaintiff. Should that plaintiff lose, the firm recovers
none of its investment. 197 A litigation financing agreement that seeks
to eliminate this contingency by requiring some form of payment,
even if the plaintiff loses, risks the invalidation of the entire
agreement under usury laws. 19 8 This leaves traditional litigation
finance firms with an all-or-nothing proposition that forces them to
weed out any potential frivolous lawsuits; a firm that takes on too
many risky cases will not be able to turn a profit.
A crowdfunded litigation financing arrangement would not be
subject to the same limitation. As crowdfunding generally relies on
relatively small monetary commitments by a large number of
individuals, relatively expensive claims can be completely funded
99
without any single individual risking a substantial sum of money.'
While in the past, an individual or firm wishing to enter the litigation

(last
194. Discover, KICKSTARTER.COM, https://www.kickstarter.com/discover/most-funded
visited Mar. 30, 2015).
195. Fastest Projects to Reach 1 Million U.S. Dollars in Crowdfunding on Kickstarter as of
February 2015, STATISTA.cOM, http://www.statista.com/statistics/254530/fastest-projects-to-reach-1million-usd-on-kickstarter/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2015); see also Richard Feloni, 'Exploding Kittens'
Hours,
Bus.
INSIDER
(Jan.
23,
2015),
Raised
$3
Million
in
72
http://www.businessinsider.com/exploding-kittens-kickstarter-success-2015-1.
196. See supra Part II.
197. Id.
198. See supra Part III.A.
199. See supra Part II.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol84/iss2/8

18

Elliott: Trial by Social Media: The Rise of Litigation Crowdfunding

2016]

TRIAL BY SOCIAL MEDIA

financing industry would need to invest a large amount of money in
small number of cases, crowdfunding makes investing in individual
cases as easy as purchasing stock. An investor could limit her risk by
investing miniscule sums in a wide variety of cases. One could
easily imagine certain investors building a portfolio that includes
stocks, bonds, and legal disputes. While hedge funds and firms
already invest in lawsuits in the litigation finance industry,2 ° °
crowdfunding further reduces their risk by limiting their involvement
in any one suit and allowing them to spread out their investments.
Lowering the risk of losing an individual or firm's entire
investment over the outcome of a single case also means that
investors can be less selective when choosing their cases. Where,
traditionally, firms could choose only those few cases that had the
strongest legal merits, the sizeable reduction of risk means that firms
that utilize crowdfunded litigation financing may invest in a larger
volume of cases that have a smaller likelihood of success. This
leaves room for additional investments, potentially increasing the
overall size of the litigation financing market.
Because reducing the risk and costs associated with lending makes
the market more accessible to more investors, crowdfunded litigation
financing also allows for the reduction in out-of-pocket costs for a
larger number of prospective plaintiffs. Many of these plaintiffs will
be those that have cases that would have been seen as too risky for
traditional firms to invest in. As the litigation financing market
grows and investors become more willing to invest in less
meritorious cases for the chance of a high payout, the number of
plaintiffs receiving funding will increase as well.
This reduced risk for plaintiffs means that more parties will be less
willing to settle. To explain this, one must understand the methods
used by plaintiffs in deciding whether to litigate their case. In
determining whether to go forward with a claim, one calculation is to
take the amount plaintiffs are likely to win if their claim is successful
and multiply it by the estimated chance of success. 20 1 This number,
subtracted by the cost of litigation, is used to determine both how
much a case is worth and whether the plaintiff should accept a given
settlement offer from the defendant. 2
As cost and likelihood of
200. Paul M. Barrett, Crowdsourcing Comes to the Booming World of 'Litigation Finance',
BLOOMBERG Bus. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-11-20/lexsharescrowdsourcing-comes-to-the-litigation-finance-world.
201. Robert Vovamick, When is Litigation Worth the Hassle?, FORBES (July 21, 2010, 6:40 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/21/when-to-sue-entrepreneurs-law-taxation-bovamick.html.
202. Id. For example, if a plaintiff could potentially win $1 million in damages, but his attorney
estimates that he is only twenty-five percent likely to succeed and would cost $100,000 to litigate after
consulting experts, potential appeals, etc., the claim would be worth $150,000. In this case, plaintiff
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success are two of the most important factors in deciding whether
plaintiffs go forward with their claims, this will mean more cases will
go to court, as plaintiffs hold out for a favorable verdict or a higher
settlement. In addition, the reduced risk for plaintiffs and larger
number of investors also means that more plaintiffs will be able to
bring their claims to court in the first place, resulting in more
lawsuits.
Finally, the business model typically used by crowdfunding
websites itself increases the risk for frivolous litigation. Typically,
crowdfunding platforms receive a commission in exchange for the
right to post a project on their website. 20 3 LexShares and Funded
Justice serve as examples of this, as both websites profit from their
clients' cases.2 °4 Both businesses receive a commission from each
project, regardless of whether the litigation is successful,
20 5 meaning
they may well earn more money by listing more projects.

B. Trial by Media

In addition to the greatly-increased risk of frivolous litigation,
there is also the risk that crowdfunded litigation financing will lead to
a greater danger of trial by media. Both LexShares and Funded
Justice are marketed as a boon to plaintiffs who have meritorious
cases but lack the necessary funds to hire a knowledgeable and
dedicated attorney. The "About Us" page on the Funded Justice
website invokes the plight of the middle class, proclaiming that "[flor
too long, the rich have always had access to the best legal minds that
money could buy, and people that were indigent have always had
access to legal aid clinics based on their income." 206 It continues,
saying "the vast majority of Middle America . . . would find it

difficult to come up with thousands of dollars on short notice to help
a family friend [get legal services.], 20 7 LexShares' website similarly

would be likely to accept a settlement offer of $250,000 if he had to foot the entire bill. However, if the
plaintiff only expected to pay half that amount, having received the other half from investors, he would
be more willing to risk litigation, especially knowing that he would have to pay a substantial portion of
the settlement back to his investors.
203. See TJ McCue, Who Needs KickstarterAnd IndieGogo? Crowdfund Yourself, FORBES (Dec.
23, 2013, 1:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2013/12/23/who-needs-kickstarter-andindiegogo-crowdfund-yourself/.
204. See supraPart H.
205. Id.
206. About Us, FUNDED JUSTICE, https://www.fundedjustice.com/en/help/about-us (last visited
Mar. 30, 2015).
207. Id.
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states, "Iitigation finance through LexShares equalizes access to
justice."
The potentially large online audience and the altruistic
presentation of each case creates a very real danger of trial by media,
as information found on these website can be spread through social
networks.
In addition to its capacity to reward funders and provide them with
equity in new businesses, crowdfunding has also long been used to
advance social causes, relying on social media as well as traditional
news outlets to rapidly disseminate popular causes. 209 Social media
outlets like Facebook and Twitter have themselves been popular
forums for seeking social justice. 2 10 There is no reason to expect that
the same will not hold true for the crowdfunding of litigation
financing. News of poor plaintiffs seeking justice can quickly spread
over to these outlets and others, soliciting large volumes of
individuals to donate or invest in a cause they believe to be worthy of
their sponsorship.
Popular social media movements, when
entrenched, can become difficult to counter.
As the defendants in litigation finance claims are generally
corporations (with suitably deep pockets), the media exposure that
crowdsourcing could bring to a case that might otherwise be ignored
by traditional media outlets could be disastrous. When facing
litigation, corporate defendants are concerned not only about the
outcome of the case, but also the impact that the case may have on
the company's public image. 211 Large and publically traded
companies face particularly large threats from high-profile lawsuits.
In cases where the public closely follows litigation, bad publicity
could have a significant impact on the goodwill of customers, as well
as significantly damage a company's stock price. This danger will
only be magnified as crowdfunding of litigation financing becomes
208. Plaintiffs, LEXSHARES, https://www.lexshares.com/pages/plaintiffs (last visited Mar. 30,
2015).
209. Examples of some of the most successful crowdfunded social causes include $5 million to
teach computer science to elementary and high school students, $1.2 million raised to form "Mayday
PAC," an anti-super political action committee aimed at reforming campaign finance laws in the United
States, and $1.37 million to create the Tesla Science Center at Wardenclyffe. See An Hour of Code for
Every Student, IND EGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/an-hour-of-code-for-every-student
(last visited Apr. 19, 2015); Joe Kloc, Mayday PAC: The Super PAC Built to Destroy Super PACs,
NEWSWEEK (June 23, 2014, 5:28PM), http://www.newsweek.com/new-super-pac-aims-bring-downsuper-pacs-256003; Larry Frum, Tesla lab saved, but more work to go, CNN (May 10, 2013, 2:52 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/10/tech/web/tesla-museum-saved/.
210. Social media has been a major tool for most of the major social movements of the 21st
century, from the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street to the protests in Ferguson. See Rubina Fillion,
The 5 Biggest Social Media Movements of 2014, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2014, 12:00 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2014/12/03/the-5-biggest-social-media-movements-of-2014/.
211. Amy Van Prooyen Greenfield, Litigation Communications in Times of Crisis, 6 ANDREWS
BANKR.LITIG. REP. 1, 1 (2009).
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more widespread.
In addition to worrying about the impact that individuals may have
on good will or stock prices, litigation financing introduces a third
danger. Individuals may contribute funds to a lawsuit against a
company simply because they oppose the company's business
practices. This is not particularly difficult to imagine, especially in
more politically-controversial industries.
Another troubling
possibility is that of a business investing in litigation against a rival
company, hoping that the ensuing court battle and media coverage
gives them a competitive advantage. As individual contributions are
only a small portion of the total funds, and financers are generally not
considered, as they have no legal control over litigation, there is
likely very little recourse in either of these scenarios.
There are several real-world examples of impromptu social media
campaigns over seemingly minor issues that damaged public
goodwill in a corporation. In 2008, after a United Airlines flight,
professional musician Dave Carroll discovered that his guitar was
broken.212 Earlier, Carroll and several other passengers had observed
baggage handlers mistreating the guitar and had warned a flight
attendant, who told Carroll that nothing could be done.213 Carroll
spent several months attempting to resolve the dispute, only to have
his claim denied because he had not filed a formal complaint within
twenty-four hours of the incident.214
Frustrated by the experience, Carroll decided to turn to social
media, producing a song called "United Breaks Guitars., 215 The
song quickly spread and within five days the video had been viewed
1.7 million times on the video website YouTube.216 Mainstream
news outlets like CNN and the CBS morning show began calling
United for interviews by the end of the week, and United was forced
to quickly shift into damage control.2 1 7 The company admitted
wrongdoing, donated $3000 to a music school as a gesture of
goodwill, and implemented changes in its customer-service practices
in response to the incident. 218 All told, the song had a very negative
effect on United's brand equity, and may have even damaged the

212. Tristan Morales, Social Media Campaigns As an Emerging Alternative to Litigation, 38
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 35, 54 (2012).
213. Id. at 53-54.
214. Id. at54.
215. Id. at 55.
216. Id. As of Mar. 28, 2015, the video has over 14 million views. Sons of Maxwell, United
Breaks Guitars,YOUTUBE (July 6, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-5YGc4zOqozo.
217. Morales, supranote 212, at 55.
218. Id. at56.
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company's stock price.
A similar incident occurred in 2005. Jeff Jarvis purchased a Dell
laptop along with an expensive four-year, in-home warranty. 220 The
laptop suffered from several malfunctions, and Jarvis was informed
that he would have to send his laptop in for repair despite his inhome warranty. 22 1 Jarvis complained about his experience on his
blog, "The Buzz Machine. ' 2
The computer continued to
malfunction, and Jarvis continued his campaign against the
company. 223 Hundreds more consumers joined in, all complaining
about Dell's customer service. 224 Eventually, mainstream media took
notice, with both the New York Times and Business Week addressing
the topic. 225 In the end, Jarvis' "Dell Hell" campaign
had a negative
226
impact on the reputation and sales of the company.
These two situations demonstrate the power for relatively minor
incidents to develop into full-fledged negative public relations
campaigns over social media. If a single broken guitar or faulty
laptop could hurt a company's public image, imagine the damage that
a crowd-funded class-action lawsuit could do. If crowd-funded
litigation finance campaigns manage to reach the popularity level of
the "United Breaks Guitars" video or one of the nearly 100
Kickstarter campaigns to reach over $1 million in less than two
months, companies could quickly find themselves lost in litigation
over issues that might have been settled or dropped altogether.
V. CONCLUSION

For better or worse, traditional litigation financing has become an
accepted reality in the majority of the United States. If wellregulated by the states and federal government, some forms of
litigation financing arrangements can be mutually beneficial for
plaintiffs and their investors. After all, litigation finance firms
provide plaintiffs with desperately-needed funding in their cases
while giving those with the money and legal acumen to carefully
219. Within four days of the song's release, United's stock price dropped ten percent, costing
shareholders $180 million. Ravi Sawhney, Broken Guitarhas United Playing the Blues to the Tune of
$180 Million, FAST COMPANY (July 30, 2009), http://www.fastcompany.com/1320152/broken-guitarhas-united-playing-blues-tune-180-million.
220. Morales, supra note 212, at 50.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 51.
224. Id.
225. Morales, supra note 212, at 51-52.
226. Id.at 50.
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consider the merits of each case another avenue of investment. And
because of the considerable risk involved, investors will always be
careful to scrutinize any potential investment opportunity.
Introducing crowdfunding to the litigation financing world,
however, is a dangerous misstep. By diluting the risk to any
individual investor or firm, crowdfunding makes it easier for those
with little legal knowledge to invest in any case they feel strongly
about, with little risk involved. This will, in turn, lead to ill-advised
investment decisions in plaintiffs with less than meritorious claims,
and may reduce a plaintiffs' willingness to settle. Finally, as
plaintiffs are offered opportunities to receive funding from investors
through the Internet, they will inevitably describe their cases in the
most positive light possible. Investors and crowdfunding platforms
that also seek to profit from these claims will further encourage this
positive portrayal.
Defendants, big or small, will have no
comparable public forum to defend themselves against potential
damage to their reputations.
If allowed to grow unchecked,
crowdfunded litigation financing could have a major impact within
the legal system.
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